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Criminal Law. State v. Brown, 709 A.2d 465 (R.I. 1998). The
right to confront witnesses does not operate to allow unfettered
trial examination by an accused sex assailant of a purported vic-
tim's medical and educational records where adequate assurances
of fair process exist otherwise. Nor does a defendant's confronta-
tional right permit cross-examination of a witness regarding mat-
ters reasonably concluded to have little or no relevance to the
criminal liability of the defendant.
In State v. Brown,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court was once
again faced with the difficult task of weighing an alleged child-mo-
lester's constitutional right of confrontation against a purported
victim's right to privacy. In Brown, a divided court determined
that a defendant's right to confront witnesses produced against
him has certain limitations, especially when there are other assur-
ances of fair process.2
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Danny L. Brown (Brown) was indicted for sexually molesting
his stepdaughter Emily Doe3 (Emily) over an approximately two-
and-a-half-year period during which Emily was between eight and
ten years old.4 At trial, Emily's testimony indicated that Brown,
the boyfriend of Emily's mother, began fondling her breasts and
her vaginal area when Emily was eight years old. 5 Later this ac-
tivity escalated to oral sex and finally to intercourse. 6 According to
Emily, Brown's abuse ended in November 1985, just before Brown
married Emily's mother.7 Emily made no mention of the abuse for
several years.8
In 1991, however, Emily revealed the abuse to her pastor,
Elizabeth Janikuak.9 Pastor Janikuak later confronted Brown
1. 709 A.2d 465 (R.I. 1998).
2. Id. at 473-74.
3. In order to protect the parties identities, the court changed the name of
the minor victim and her mother in the opinion. See id. at 467 n.1.
4. See id. at 467.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 468.
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with Emily's accusations, which Brown denied.' 0 Brown did, how-
ever, tell Pastor Janikuak that on one occasion, several years ear-
lier, Emily had reached into his underwear and fondled his penis
while he was sleeping on the living-room couch." Brown consented
to counseling with a Christian psychiatrist in Connecticut, Richard
Tanguay, M.D., to whom Brown eventually confessed that he had
sexually abused Emily in the past.12
Emily revealed the full extent of Brown's sexual abuse to her
mother for the first time on April 7, 1992.13 On April 30, 1992,
Emily's mother reported the information to the police, and formal
criminal proceedings against Brown commenced. 14 After a three-
day trial, a jury returned guilty verdicts against Brown on Novem-
ber 30, 1994.15 Brown was sentenced to forty years imprisonment,
with twenty years suspended, and twenty years probation. 16
Brown moved for new trial and, after Superior Court Judge
Sheehan denied the motion, appealed to the Supreme Court. 17
Brown's appeal raised six issues and culminated in a per cu-
rium opinion issued on March 5, 1997, State v. Brown'8 (hereinaf-
ter "Brown 1"). A four-justice panel of the supreme court in Brown
I dismissed two of Brown's issues but was evenly divided on the
remaining four issues. 19 Brown then moved for an opportunity to
reargue the four issues before a full five-justice panel.20 The court
granted the request.21
ANALYsis AND HOLDING
In the instant case, Brown once again alleges the four un-
resolved claims of error upon which this court was previously dead-
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. Dr. Tanguay testified at trial that Brown's reaction, although ad-
missive, was "minimizing" the true extent of the sexual contact between Brown
and Emily. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 467.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. 690 A.2d 1336 (R.I. 1997).
19. See Brown, 709 A.2d at 467.
20. See id.
21. See id.
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locked.22 Brown's first unresolved claim of error concerns the
motion justice's denial of Brown's motion to compel production of a
broad panoply of pediatric medical records pertaining to the juve-
nile victim.23 Second, Brown claims that the trial justice's prohibi-
tion of cross-examination of Pastor Janikuak concerning
Janikuak's possible bias violated the Defendant's right to con-
front.24 Third, the defendant contends that the trial justice's re-
striction of cross-examination of complainant's mother about her
failure to notify the Department of Children, Youth, and Families
(DCYF) of the abuse allegations represented denial of the confron-
tation right.25 And finally, Brown insists that the admission of
statements by Pastor Janikuak, which gave assurances of the vic-
tim's truthfulness, represented impermissible bolstering
testimony.26
Issue 1: Production of Pediatric Medical Records Pertaining to
a Juvenile Victim
The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that the denial
of Brown's pretrial motion to compel production of various pediat-
ric medical records relating to the victim did not constitute prejudi-
cial error.27 The court's decision was based, in part, upon a finding
that the justice's denial was a mere provisional ruling, since it oc-
curred one year prior to the trial's commencement. 28 Furthermore,
the court noted that Brown's counsel had adequate time to resub-
mit the request in a more limited and timely manner in the months
preceding the trial.29 Brown's motion requested the State to pro-
duce the names and addresses of "any and all pediatricians or med-
ical doctors from whom [Emily] may have received treatment or
been examined from the period May of 1983 through January of
1987."30 The court held that Brown was not entitled to obtain this
information during routine pretrial discovery according to the well-
established precedents of Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of
22. See id. at 468.
23. See id. at 469.
24. See id. at 473.
25. See id. at 475.
26. See id. at 477,
27. See id. at 469.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. Id.
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Criminal Procedure,3 ' and that the information should have more
properly been sought directly from its source at the time of trial.32
Furthermore, because Brown's counsel failed to seek the informa-
tion at trial, the court held that the issue was not properly
preserved. 33
"Here," wrote Justice Flanders for the majority, "[Brown] was
never improperly denied the ability to confront and to effectively
cross-examine any adverse witnesses against him."34 Rather, the
motion court had issued a denial of Brown's motion far in advance
of trial due to the motion's overbroad scope and premature na-
ture.35 Therefore, the trial court's ruling did not violate the consti-
tutional right to confront accusers because Brown had the
opportunity to scale back the breadth of his motion and resubmit it
before or at trial; or, in the alternative, seek an in camera review of
the requested information. 36
Issue 2: Denial of Cross-Examination Concerning Witness'
Alleged Bias
Brown asserted that the trial justice had committed reversible
error by prohibiting his attorney from cross-examining Pastor
Janikuak with regard to her bias due to tensions concerning con-
struction work done on the pastor's church.37 It seems that de-
fendant Brown was instrumental in securing the construction
team employed by Janikuak to build a new church facility in
Smithfield, Rhode Island in 1991.38 Problems had apparently de-
veloped between Brown's cousin, who performed excavation work
on the project, and Janikuak to the extent that Brown's cousin had
filed a civil suit against the church seeking monetary damages. 39
At trial the court quickly ended all questioning of Janikuak con-
cerning this matter when Janikuak denied that Brown's cousin
31. See id. (citing State v. Kelly, 554 A.2d 632, 635 (R.I. 1989)).
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 470 (noting that the hearing justice's denial of the motion had
been expressly conditional by the inclusion of the phrase "at this point").
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 485 (Weisberger, C.J., dissenting).
39. See id.
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had ever been involved in the construction of the new church
facility.40
The supreme court held that the lower court's prohibition of
questioning concerning Pastor Janikuak's possible bias fell within
the court's reasonable discretion to narrow questioning where the
"offer of proof was wholly inadequate to indicate that allowing ad-
ditional cross-examination would have developed probative evi-
dence of bias."41 Additionally, the ruling of the trial court would
not have been reversible even if it had been beyond the trial court's
discretion, according to the supreme court, unless the indiscretion-
ate ruling had been unfairly prejudicial. 42 Thus, according to the
majority, "[ulnless all these [prosecution witnesses] were liars and
unless defendant himself was lying when he made the admissions
about the sexual touching that had occurred, then the trial justice's
minor restriction of Janikuak's cross-examination-if error it
was-was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."43
Issue 3: Restriction of Cross-Examination of the Victim's
Mother Concerning her Failure to Notify the DCYF
Brown also contended that the trial court erred in precluding
cross-examination of Emily's mother with regard to her failure to
notify state social work authorities of her daughter's alleged sexual
abuse.44 Brown asserted that Emily's mother's violation of Rhode
Island General Laws section 40-11-3, which places a duty upon
Rhode Islanders to notify the DCYF of any knowledge or suspicion
of child abuse, represented clear impeachment evidence indicating
that the mother did not herself believe that the sexual abuse was
going on. 45
The supreme court held, however, that the trial justice's prohi-
bition on such cross-examination was not outside the court's dis-
cretion.46 The admission of the statute into the concerns of the
trial jury had the likelihood of misleading the jury into discrediting
the witness' testimony solely because the witness was in violation
40. See id. at 473-74.
41. Id. at 474 (citing State v. Doctor, 690 A.2d 321, 327 (R.I. 1997)).
42. See id. at 475 (citations omitted).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 476.
45. See id.
46. See id.
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of a specific statutory obligation.47 Since, the court noted, the wit-
ness may have had no knowledge of the statutory requirement,
prohibition of such evidence was well within the trial justice's
discretion. 4a
Issue 4: Bolstering
Bolstering occurs when "one item of evidence is improperly
used by a party to add credence or weight to some earlier un-im-
peached piece of evidence offered by the same party."49 Brown's
final challenge was that Pastor Janikuak's testimony regarding
the truthfulness of the alleged victim represented bolstering testi-
mony which should have been excluded.50 The court agreed that a
witness should not be allowed to offer an opinion concerning the
truthfulness of another witness' testimony.5 ' In this case, how-
ever, the court concluded that the Pastor's testimony did not serve
to bolster the Emily's testimony as much as it expressed concerns
about moving cautiously while questioning someone about such
sensitive matters.5 2
The court concluded from that Pastor Janikuak's "overall tes-
timony" was not vouching for the credibility of the complainant's
sexual-abuse allegations.5 3 Indeed, wrote Justice Flanders, "a close
look at Janikuak's overall testimony on this point reveals that the
pastor herself could not determine whether complainant (in her al-
legations) or defendant (in his denials) was being truthful."5 4
Thus, the supreme court refused to accept any of Brown's argu-
ments as requiring a new trial.
47. See id. at 477.
48. See id.
49. Black's Law Dictionary 176 (6th ed. 1990).
50. The pertinent portion of Pasor Janikuak's testimony is as follows:
PROSECUTOR: Upon learning this information, what was your reac-
tion? What was your response?
JAmKUAy: As to what she said to me?
PROSECUTOR: Yes, without saying what she said.
JANIKUAK: I was very cautious to make sure that what she was tell-
ing me was the truth because we're trained to be sure that just because
someone makes an allegation does not mean it's true.
Brown, 709 A.2d at 478 n.13.
51. See id. at 479.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 481.
54. Id. at 480.
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Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Weisberger and Justice Shea (Ret.) dissented in
an emotionally charged opinion drafted by Weisberger. The dis-
sent began by proclaiming that "the history of liberty has largely
been the history of the observance of procedural safeguards." 55 De-
fendant Brown was denied procedural safeguards, according to the
Chief Justice, because the denial of his motion to compel produc-
tion of, among other things, the identity of all physicians who may
have treated or examined Emily, "fell squarely within the parame-
ters" of Brown's plausible need for the information. 56 Brown had
requested the information in order to glean any inconsistencies be-
tween the complainant's allegations and her medical records.
Thus, according to the dissent, the two-prong test of both material-
ity and favorability laid out by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Valenzuela-Berna157 was satisfied. 58 Therefore,
Brown should have been provided with this information.
Weisberger also disputed the majority's implied holding that
the motion justice's denial of Brown's request "at this point" was
merely conditional and that Brown's failure to resubmit his re-
quest at a later date constituted waiver of the issue.59 Such a no-
tion, wrote the Chief Justice, "is without support in law and
unpersuasive in concept."6° The dissent further stated "that de-
fendant's request was both reasonable and relevant, given the
facts as established at the time of the motion justice's denial."61
Concerning the denial of Brown's right to cross-examine Pas-
tor Janikuak regarding her bias concerning the church's difficul-
ties with Brown's cousin, the dissent argued that time-tested
principles should have worked to provide Brown with an opportu-
nity to confront the pastor on such subjects.62 Not only would such
cross-examination have "cast a less hospitable light on the totality
55. Id. at 481 (citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943)).
56. Id. at 483.
57. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
58. Brown, 709 A.2d at 483 (citing United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458
U.S. 858, 867 (1982) (recognizing that a defendant must make "at least some plau-
sible showing of how [the requested material] would have been both material and
favorable to his defense")).
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 484.
62. See id. at 486.
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of her severely damaging testimony," but denial of such cross-ex-
amination violates long-standing doctrine establishing the rele-
vance of pending civil litigation between a witness and a party to
the issue of bias.63
The dissent likewise concluded that Pastor Janikuak's state-
ments of opinion regarding the truthfulness of Emily should have
been either excluded or remedied with a stern jury instruction. 64
According to the dissenters, the pretrial and trial errors in Brown's
case, taken together, "undermine confidence that the defendant's
conviction was the product of a constitutionally fair process,"
therefore warranting a reversal. 65
CONCLUSION
In State v. Brown, the Rhode Island Supreme Court denied de-
fendant's four challenges concerning his constitutional right to
confront adverse witnesses. The court found that the trial justice's
denial of defendant's motion to compel discovery was not reversible
error where there existed an adequate opportunity to narrow the
scope of his discovery request prior to trial. The court further up-
held the trial justice's denial of defendant's request to cross-ex-
amine a state's witness regarding possible bias where the
defendant's offer of proof was an inadequate showing of the prob-
able existence of such bias. Additionally, the supreme court deter-
mined that the trial justice did not err is refusing to admit
testimony concerning the victim's mother's failure to notify DCYF
concerning defendant's alleged conduct, as such testimony would
be likely to mislead the jury. Finally, the court concluded that a
witness' statements indicating that the witness was very careful to
ascertain the truthfulness of the victim's allegations did not repre-
sent improper bolstering.
Roger I. Roots
63. Id. The dissent conceded that Brown himself was not a named party to
the civil action, but said that the fact that he was instrumental in assembling the
construction team, which included his brother and which was now suing Janikuak
and her church, "merited at least some opportunity to probe the issue." Id.
64. See id. at 487.
65. Id. at 490.
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Criminal Law. State v. DiCicco, 707 A.2d 251 (R.I. 1998). In a
prosecution for driving under the influence and driving under the
influence, death resulting, a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10%
or higher is not an essential element to prove either charge.
Rather, the prosecutor may, by other competent evidence, prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was under the influ-
ence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely
operating a vehicle.
In State v. DiCicco,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court was
asked to certify two questions of law. First, whether in a criminal
prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol, death result-
ing, or driving under the influence, "is a blood alcohol level of 0.10
percent or greater, an essential element of the offense or can the
state attempt to establish the element of 'under the influence of
alcohol' by proof of a blood alcohol level of less than 0.10 percent?"
2
Second, "[ilf the state is entitled to prove that an operator with a
blood alcohol level of less than 0.10 percent was nonetheless under
the influence, what is the standard to establish this element of
'under the influence of alcohol'?"3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On December 17, 1994, at 9:15 p.m., the defendant was driving
his employer's truck on the access road inside Lincoln Greyhound
Park in Lincoln, Rhode Island.4 The defendant was driving about
40 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. zone when he struck a pedestrian, Maria
Carlino, who later died from her resulting injuries.5
The police arrived and administered three field sobriety tests:
1) the "horizontal gaze nystagmus"; 2) the "walk and turn" and 3)
the "finger to nose" tests.6 Based on the defendant failing these
three tests, plus the fact that the police officer observed that the
defendant had "glossy eyes" and could smell the odor of alcohol on
the defendant's breath, the defendant was placed under arrest.
7
The defendant then took a blood test which resulted in ".00% BAC
1. 707 A.2d 251 (R.I. 1998).
2. Id. at 252.
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
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or negative."8 The defendant admited to drinking approximately
four beers at about 4:30 p.m.9
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Question 1
First, the supreme court was asked whether a BAC of 0.10 or
greater is an essential element to obtain a conviction under either
sections 31-27-2 or 31-27-2.2 of the Rhode Island General Laws. 10
Rhode Island General Laws section 31-27-2 provides that
"[wihoever operates . . . any vehicle in the state while under the
influence of any intoxicating liquor ... shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor."" The statute also provides a BAC of 0.10 or greater is a
violation of this statute.' 2 However, even without a BAC test, a
conviction may be sustained if "based on other admissible evi-
dence."13 The statute provides a guilty verdict may be obtained if
it was "based on evidence that the person charged was under the
influence of intoxicating liquor ... to a degree which rendered such
person incapable of safely operating a vehicle."14 Rhode Island
General Laws section 31-27-2.2 provides "[wihen the death of any
person other than the operator ensues as a proximate result of any
injury received by the operation of any vehicle, the operator of
which is under the influence of any intoxicating liquor ... the per-
son so operating the vehicle shall be guilty of 'driving under the
influence of liquor or drugs, resulting in death.'"" 5
In interpreting statutes the court followed the well-settled
principle that "when the language of a statute is clear and unam-
biguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally" in order to
give the words "their plain and ordinary meaning."16 Turning to
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 253.
11. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2(a) (1956) (1994 Reenactment)).
12. See id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2(b)(1) (1956) (1994 Reenactment)).
13. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2(b)(1) (1956) (1994
Reenactment)).
14. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2(b)(1) (1956) (1994
Reenactment)).
15. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2.2(a) (1956) (1994
Reenactment)).
16. Id. (quoting Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d
1223, 1226 (R.I. 1996)).
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the statutes before it, the court recognized the wrongs proscribed
under both statutes were identical.' 7 Both statutes prohibited op-
eration of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicat-
ing liquor.' 8  The court noted that section 31-27-2(b)(1)
unequivocally provides a conviction may be sustained if based on
admissible evidence other than the BAC level.' 9 And, recognizing
section 31-27-2.2 has no similar language, the court felt it should
be interpreted likewise, relying on "the well-known canon of statu-
tory construction in pari materia [which] dictates that similar stat-
utes should be interpreted similarly."20 Other than the plain
language of the statute, the court also noted its own precedents
which have held a conviction under section 31-27-2.2 may be based
on evidence besides the BAC level.2 '
The court rejected the defendant's argument that the State
could not convict him based on other evidence when a chemical test
was administered and resulted in a BAC of less than 0.10 per-
cent. 22 The court stated that the state may always present all ad-
missible evidence to a judge or jury in a criminal proceeding which
"it believes most strongly makes its case."23 The court did not feel
that only drivers with a BAC level of 0.10 or greater were threats
to public safety.24 To hold this would "negate the goal of legisla-
tion against drunken driving, which is to reduce the carnage occur-
ring on our highways attributable to persons who imbibe alcohol
and then drive."25
The court therefore answered Question 1 in the negative, hold-
ing "[a] BAC of 0.10 percent or greater is not an essential element
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 254.
20. Id.
21. See id. (citing State v. Benoit, 650 A.2d 1230, 1233 (R.I. 1994) (noting that
"t]o sustain a conviction under § 31-27-2.2(a), the state must produce sufficient
evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant's manner of operating his or her
motor vehicle was a proximate cause of the victim's death and that the collision
occurred while the defendant was legally intoxicated") and State v. Sahady, 694
A.2d 707, 709 (R.I. 1997) (holding evidence showing the defendant's speech was
slurred, his eyes were bloodshot, he emitted an odor of alcohol and he failed four
field sobriety tests was sufficient evidence to conclude he was "intoxicated")).
22. See id.
23. Id. at 254-55.
24. See id.
25. Id. (quoting State v. Bruskie, 536 A.2d 522, 524 (R.I. 1988)).
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of the offenses proscribed by sections 31-27-2 and 31-27-2.2."26 The
court concluded "[bilood alcohol content is but one weapon with
which the state can stem the blight of drunk drivers; it is not a
shackle."27
Question 2
Next, the court had to determine what standard of proof is nec-
essary to establish the element of under the influence of alcohol
when a defendant has a BAC level of less than 0.10 percent.28 The
court, citing State v. Lusi,29 began this analysis by stating "the
standard necessary for a criminal conviction is proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."30 In Lusi, the court held a defendant is entitled to
an acquittal under section 31-27-2 of the Rhode Island General
Laws if his BAC was less than 0.10 percent and "the state other-
wise fail[s] to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was
driving under the influence."3 ' However, to obtain a conviction,
the state may rely on "evidence other than direct evidence as long
as the totality of that evidence constitutes proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt."32
In DiCicco, the court felt it necessary to state explicitly what it
had only implied in Lusi.33 That is, "in the absence of a BAC test
having been administered or if a test results in a BAC of less than
0.10 percent, a conviction under [R.I.G.L.] §§ 31-27-2 or 31-27-2.2
shall be sustained if the totality of other competent evidence estab-
lishes beyond a reasonable doubt that a person was under the in-
fluence of 'intoxicating liquor ... to a degree which rendered such
person incapable of safely operating a vehicle.'" 34
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court applied its precedents and
rules of statutory construction in determining that a blood alcohol
content of 0.10 or higher is not an essential element to convict a
26. Id. at 255-56.
27. Id. at 256.
28. See id.
29. 625 A.2d 1350 (R.I. 1993).
30. DiCicco, 707 A.2d at 256 (quoting Lusi, 625 A.2d at 1356).
31. Id. (quoting Lusi, 625 A.2d at 1357).
32. Id. (quoting Lusi, 625 A.2d at 1357).
33. See id.
34. Id. at 256-57.
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defendant under Rhode Island General Laws section 31-27-2 or 31-
27-2.2. Recognizing the legislature's concern for public safety in
enacting these statutes, the court looked to a literal application of
the statutes in answering these two questions. Prosecutors in
Rhode Island may now attain convictions of "under the influence"
crimes on any admissible evidence of intoxication rather than hav-
ing a BAC test be solely determinative of intoxication.
Thomas M. Robinson
SURVEY SECTION
Criminal Law. State v. Parkhurst, 706 A.2d 412 (R.I. 1998).
Under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, the fact
that evidence of the defendant's criminal conduct was introduced
at trial during the prosecutor's case-in-chief rather than in rebut-
tal is immaterial to its admissibility as other crimes evidence,
when there is an obvious attempt by defense counsel to raise the
jury's consciousness of the defendant's diminished capacity during
cross-examination. Also, jury instructions will be sufficient if they
inform the jury of the elements the state has to prove in order to
obtain a conviction, even if the instructions are not perfect.
In State v. Parkhurst,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court ad-
dressed the problem concerning admissibility of other criminal
conduct. In Parkhurst, the court determined that, when defense
counsel raises the defense of diminished capacity, the state may
introduce evidence of other bad acts which took place just hours
following the crime for which defendant is being tried.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
When his parents left for vacation on November 23, 1992,
Trevor Ramella (Trevor) hosted several parties over a five day pe-
riod.2 On November 23, Trevor hosted a party with several teens
and young adults attending.3 Soon afterward, Trevor got into a
confrontation with the defendant, Steven Parkhurst (Parkhurst),
concerning an incident with an intoxicated girl.4 As a result,
Trevor ejected the defendant from the party at gunpoint.5 Accord-
ing to one witness, defendant was angry with Trevor and wanted
to get him back.6 The next night at another party at Trevor's
house, the defendant was overheard saying that he was going to
kill Trevor on the last night of the party.7
Once again on November 27, the defendant and several other
individuals arrived at Trevor Ramella's house for another party.8
By 9:30 p.m., about forty youths had gathered at the Ramella
1. 706 A.2d 412 (R.I. 1998).
2. See id. at 415.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 416.
8. See id.
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home.9 Concerned that the party might be getting out of hand,
Trevor got a handgun and ordered several people to leave, includ-
ing the defendant.' 0 After leaving Ramella's house, the defendant
and others went to another party, before again returning to
Trevor's.11 Eventually, only a handful of people remained. Then,
upon hearing noises sounds similar to people running around the
house, Trevor went upstairs to investigate. 12 Soon afterward,
Trevor shouted, "Itihey got my guns,"' 3 and ran from the room.14
Charles Mayer (Mayer), a friend of Trevor's, discovered that a re-
volver was missing from the bedroom, as well as a hunting rifle
and some ammunition.' 5 Mayer then ran to the front door and saw
Trevor lying face down in a pool of blood. 16 He also saw the de-
fendant standing over Trevor with a revolver in his hand.17 The
defendant and an accomplice then stole the Ramella's Toyota
Celica and drove away.' 8
Two days later, the defendant and his accomplice were ar-
rested in Indiana. 19 They were driving the Ramella's Celica, and a
.22 caliber revolver was found under the driver's seat.20 The de-
fendant was found guilty of first degree murder, conspiracy to com-
mit murder, breaking and entering, larceny of a firearm and
carrying a stolen firearm while committing a crime of violence.21
The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge
improperly admitted evidence of defendant's other criminal acts in
anticipation of a defense not yet proffered, and that the second-
degree murder jury instructions were so confusing and contradic-
tory that a reversal of his conviction is required.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 417.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 418.
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ANALYsis AND HOLDING
R.I. Rule of Evidence 404 (b)
The defendant first argues that the trial judge erred by admit-
ting evidence, pursuant to Rule of Evidence 404(b), concerning
other crimes he committed, in anticipation of a defense not yet
proffered.22 Although evidence of other crimes is not admissible to
prove the defendant's propensity to commit the crime, it is admissi-
ble to establish motive, intent, common plan or scheme or the iden-
tity of the perpetrator.
In the present case, while cross-examining a state's witness,
defense counsel asked more than thirty questions relating to alco-
hol consumption and the defendant's participation therein. 23 This,
according to the court, clearly showed that the defense raised the
issue of intoxication before presenting the defendant's case to the
jury.24 Therefore, the state then had the burden of negating intox-
ication in order to prove defendant's premeditated intent to kill.2 5
Thus, the state's introduction of evidence concerning defend-
ant's robbery four hours after the killing of Trevor Ramella, and
his use of the revolver to commit that crime, tended to rebut the
claim of an accidental shooting caused by intoxication.26 The court
determined that the fact that this evidence was introduced during
the prosecutor's case in chief, rather than in rebuttal, is immate-
rial in light of defense counsel raising the defense of intoxication
during cross-examination. 27
Furthermore, the robbery was evidence of defendant's intent
to kill Trevor Ramella and finance his flight from authority. 28 Dur-
ing the course of the trial, the state presented evidence that prior
22. Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence states in part that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, iden-
tity, absence of mistake or accident, or to prove that defendant feared im-
minent bodily harm and that the fear was reasonable.
Id.
23. See Parkhurst, 706 A.2d at 424.
24. See id.
25. See id. (citing State v. Sanden, 626 A.2d 194, 199 (R.I. 1993)).
26. See id.
27. See id. at 425.
28. See id.
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to the shooting, the defendant and his accomplice talked about how
they planned to kill Trevor and leave the state.29 Therefore, the
robbery is corroborating evidence of a conspiracy between the de-
fendant and his accomplice to kill Trevor and leave Rhode Island.30
The state introduced this evidence, not to prove propensity, but to
prove premeditation and consciousness of guilt.3 1
Improper Jury Instructions
The defendant's next argument was that the trial judge's in-
structions to the jury regarding second degree murder were so con-
fusing and contradictory that a reversal of his conviction was
required. According to the court, defendants, except in rare cir-
cumstances not present in this case, cannot challenge jury instruc-
tions on appeal unless a proper objection exists on the record.3 2
Therefore, defense counsel's failure to object constituted a waiver
of the right to challenge imperfections in the instructions on ap-
peal.33 However, even if the defense had preserved this issue on
appeal, no prejudice to the defendant occurred to warrant a rever-
sal of his conviction.3 4A conviction of first-degree murder requires the state to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant possessed a premedi-
tated intent to kill of more than a momentary duration. Whereas,
if the intent to kill was merely momentary, the accused shall be
guilty of second-degree murder.35 Thus, if the trial judge instructs
the jury on both of these charges, the judge must set forth the de-
terminative factors that distinguish first and second degree mur-
der.3 6 In the present case, the judge instructed the jury that
"premeditation and deliberation are not elements of murder in the
second degree,"37 but then subsequently instructed that "the dis-
tinction between first- and second-degree murder is the length of
time of the premeditation."38 Although these instructions are not
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 422 (citing State v. Vargas, 420 A.2d 809, 815-16 (R.I. 1980)).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 421 (citing State v. Grabowski, 644 A.2d 1282, 1285 (R.I. 1994)).
36. See id. (citing State v. Fenik, 121 A. 218, 221 (R.I. 1923)).
37. Id. at 421.
38. Id.
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perfect, the court said, the instructions in its entirety adequately
set forth for the jury the elements of first and second degree mur-
der, and the factors distinguishing them.39
Furthermore, the jury found that the defendant harbored, for
more than a mere moment, a premeditated intent to kill Trevor
Ramella in convicting the defendant of first-degree murder.4°
Therefore, any uncertainty caused by the jury instructions on sec-
ond-degree murder are irrelevant.4 1
CONCLUSION
In State v. Parkhurst, the Rhode Island Supreme Court deter-
mined that Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 404(b) permits the pros-
ecution to introduce evidence of other crimes committed by the
defendant during its case in chief, rather than in rebuttal, when
the defense counsel has attempted to raise the jury's consciousness
of defendant's diminished capacity during cross-examination.
Also, potentially confusing jury instructions are sufficient if they
adequately set forth the distinctions between first- and second-de-
gree murder.
Ryan M. Borges
39. See id. at 422.
40. See id.
41. See id.
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Criminal Law. State v. Pena-Lora, 710 A.2d 1262 (R.I. 1998).
Defendants who obtain an owner's permission to operate the
owner's automobile have standing to challenge the legality of a
subsequent automobile search.
In State v. Pena-Lora,1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court deter-
mined whether a defendant, driving an automobile with the
owner's permission, has standing to challenge the legality of a
search. 2 The defendant has the burden of establishing his or her
standing to challenge the search.3 To do so, the defendant must
produce evidence that he or she permissively operated the owner's
vehicle.4 Such evidence of permission is crucial because, if it is ac-
cepted by the trial judge, it establishes the defendant's claim of
standing.5 Since the trial judge is not bound by the evidentiary
rule regarding hearsay during a preliminary suppression hearing,
a defendant may introduce evidence of out-of-court statements
tending to prove that he operated the owner's automobile with the
owner's permission.6
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In the early morning hours of April 15, 1992, two State Police
Troopers, Eric L. Croce (Croce) and James E. Swanberg
(Swanberg), driving in a marked police cruiser, were patrolling
Eddy Street in Providence, Rhode Island.7 As the officers ap-
proached the intersection of Eddy Street and Thurbers Avenue,
they noticed the defendant, Juan Pena-Lora (Pena-Lora), driving a
1. 710 A.2d 1262 (R.I. 1998).
2. Id. at 1264.
3. See id. at 1265.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 1264, 1266.
6. See id. at 1264 (stating that "[i]t is clear that the rules of evidence do not
apply to '[tihe determination of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of
evidence when the issue is to be determined by the trial justice under Rule 104'")
(quoting R.I. R. Evid. 101(B)(1)); see also R.I. R. Evid. 104(b) (stating that "[wihen
the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the
court shall admit it upon the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a find-
ing of the fulfillment of the condition"). In Pena-Lora, the court held that, based on
Rule 104(b), "the trial justice is not bound by the rules of evidence when resolving
preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of evidence. The only excep-
tion to this general rule is with respect to questions of privilege." Pena-Lora, 710
A.2d at 1264.
7. See Pena-Lora, 710 A.2d at 1262.
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compact automobile 8 The defendant proceeded through the inter-
section, failing to stop for a red traffic light.9 The officers turned on
the police cruiser's lights and followed Pena-Lora, who pulled over
to the side of the road. 10
While Swanberg approached Pena-Lora from the driver's side,
Croce approached from the passenger side." To ensure their per-
sonal safety, both officers directed their flashlights into the back-
seat of the vehicle. 12 When Swanberg asked to see Pena-Lora's
driver's license and the 'car's registration, the defendant com-
plied.1 3 The registration indicated that the car belonged to Sonia
Lora (Lora) of Massachusetts. 14 Meanwhile, Croce noticed "a
brown paper bag wrapped in a white plastic bag on the vehicle's
rear floor adjacent to the back seat."' 5 The bag contained irregu-
larly shaped packages wrapped in duct tape.' 6 Based on his expe-
rience and training, Croce believed that such packages indicated
drug trafficking.' 7 As a result, Pena-Lora was handcuffed and
placed in the police cruiser.' 8
Croce then commenced to search the bag.19 Inside, he found
four bundles, one of which was not wrapped in duct tape.20 This
bundle, consisting of only clear plastic packaging, revealed "a
white fluffy substance."21 The defendant was subsequently ar-
rested; the contents of two of the bundles later tested positive as
cocaine. 22 Thus, the defendant was charged with possession of
more than one kilogram of cocaine. 23
Pena-Lora denied any connection to the cocaine.24 He stated
that, after midnight, he had received an anonymous telephone call
8. See id,
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 1262-63.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
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from a woman who implored Pena-Lora, a mechanic, to repair her
car.2 5 He agreed to help and, after obtaining a ride from a friend,
he proceeded to the location along the highway where the car broke
down.26 After his friend helped him jump-start the vehicle, Pena-
Lora drove off toward Thurbers Avenue.2 7 Soon after, he encoun-
tered the officers.
At the preliminary suppression hearing prior to trial, Pena-
Lora attempted to cliallenge the legality of the automobile search
and subsequent seizure of the cocaine. 28 In order to prevail on the
suppression motion, Pena-Lora had to establish his standing to
challenge the search.29 Thus, he testified that the owner gave him
permission to drive her automobile so that he could perform repair
work at his garage. 30 The trial judge determined that mere posses-
sion of the vehicle's keys, coupled with Pena-Lora's testimony, did
not establish the defendant's standing.31 Therefore, since he
lacked standing, Pena-Lora could not challenge the legality of the
search. 32
Although the case proceeded to trial, the trial judge, on motion
of the defendant, passed the case so that the defendant could in-
vestigate newly revealed evidence. 33 The evidence, in part, con-
sisted of a telephone conversation between Lora, the owner of the
automobile, and Croce. 34 Also, Lora had signed a transcript of her
telephone conversation with Croce and provided two additional
statements to the police. 35
Prior to the second trial, Pena-Lora, at the second suppression
hearing, attempted to establish his standing to challenge the
search. 36 He wished to introduce Lora's out-of-court recorded
statements to Croce. 37 Those statements, although contradicting
the time and place that Pena-Lora took possession of the automo-
25. See id,
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 1264.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
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bile, tended to prove that Lora, the owner of the vehicle, did in fact
give the defendant permission to operate her car.38 The trial judge
refused to allow the statements into evidence, determining that
they were hearsay and not subject to any exception.3 9 Therefore,
the trial judge once again determined that Pena-Lora was not in
legitimate possession of the automobile and thus lacked standing
to challenge the search.40 After the subsequent jury trial, the "de-
fendant was convicted on one count of possession of more than one
kilogram of cocaine."41 He was placed on probation for twenty-five
years after receiving a suspended prison sentence of twenty-five
years.42
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the supreme court determined that the trial jus-
tice's exclusion of Lora's out-of-court statements, on the basis that
they were hearsay and did not fall within a requisite exception,
was reversible error.43 Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 804, the ba-
sis for the trial judge's determination, did not apply during the pre-
liminary suppression hearing. 4 The court went on to conclude
that the trial judge's error prejudiced the defendant. 45 By refusing
to consider the out-of-court statements, the trial judge prevented
Pena-Lora from "adequately addressing [his] assertion that a non-
owner automobile operator can establish standing to challenge a
search of the vehicle on the basis of permission from the owner to
use the vehicle."46 The automobile owner's out-of-court state-
ments, if accepted by the trial judge, could have established the
defendant's standing to challenge the legality of the search. Thus,
if the search was illegal, the trial judge could suppress the cocaine
evidence seized from the vehicle. 47 Therefore, when the trial judge
later admitted the cocaine evidence at the defendant's jury trial,
38. See id.
39. See id.; see also R.I. R. Evid. 804 (defining hearsay exceptions involving
unavailable declarants).
40. See Pena-Lora, 710 A.2d at 1264.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.; see also supra notes 6 & 39.
45. See Pena-Lora, 710 A.2d at 1264.
46. Id
47. See id. at 1265.
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the admission prejudiced the defendant "[blecause the cocaine evi-
dence was the only evidence that could support the state's case
."48
The supreme court relied on case law supporting the defend-
ant's proposition that one driving an automobile with permission
from the owner has standing to challenge a police search of the
vehicle.49 In particular, the court cited United States v. Garcia5°
and United States v. Lampkins.51 In Garcia, the defendant pos-
sessed standing based solely on the fact that he was driving the
owner's automobile with the owner's permission. 52 In Lampkins,
although the defendant had permission to perform repair work, the
owner never gave the defendant permission to drive the automo-
bile.5 3 The defendant claimed that he had standing to challenge
the vehicle search and the court agreed, stating that "the defend-
ant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched vehicle
absent any evidence from the government to prove that the auto-
mobile had in fact been stolen."54
In Garcia, the Seventh Circuit determined that, when the is-
sue is whether the defendant stole the automobile or borrowed it
with permission from the owner, the government has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the vehicle in
question is not being used with the owner's permission. 55 Simi-
larly in Lampkins, the United States District Court held that the
defendant had standing because the government did not offer any
evidence to contradict the defendant's testimony that he had per-
mission to perform repair work on the owner's car. 56 Therefore,
the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus the
requisite standing to contest the search of the automobile.57
The Rhode Island Supreme Court disagreed with the conten-
tion in both Garcia and Lampkins that the state has the burden of
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. 897 F.2d 1413, 1417-18 (7th Cir. 1990), affd, 22 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 949 (1994).
51. 811 F. Supp. 164, 169 (D. Del. 1993).
52. See Pena-Lora, 710 A.2d at 1265 (citing Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1418).
53. See Pena-Lora, 710 A.2d at 1265 (citing Lampkins, 811 F. Supp. at 168-
69).
54. Id.
55. See Pena-Lora, 710 A.2d at 1265 (citing Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1418).
56. See Lampkins, 811 F. Supp. at 169.
57. See id.
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disproving an automobile operator's standing by introducing evi-
dence that the operator stole or wrongfully possessed the owner's
vehicle.58 The court stated that:
We do not agree that in the absence of any evidence of auto-
mobile theft or wrongful possession presented by the state, a
nonowner automobile operator has standing to challenge a
search therein. We believe those statements in Garcia and
Lampkins are contrary to the well-settled rule in this juris-
diction that a defendant assumes the burden of establishing
his or her standing to challenge the admissibility of seized
evidence. 59
Rather, the court cited Garcia and Lampkins merely to illustrate
the important role of "permissive use" in the standing inquiry.60
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Lora's out-of-court
statements tended to prove that the defendant had permission to
drive the owner's automobile.61 If the pretrial suppression hearing
judge accepted such evidence, then the judge could have deter-
mined that Pena-Lora possessed the necessary standing to chal-
lenge the legality of the vehicle search. If seized during an illegal
search, the trial judge may have suppressed the cocaine evi-
dence. 62 Therefore, the court remanded the case to the trial judge
so that, in light of the court's findings, he may further consider the
defendant's motion to suppress in light of those out-of-court
statements. 6
3
CONCLUSION
Establishing the link between "permissive use" of an automo-
bile and one's ability to challenge the legality of an vehicle search,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court clarified the standing inquiry.
The court relied on precedent from federal courts to support the
58. See Pena-Lora, 710 A.2d at 1265.
59. Id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130-31 n.1 (1978) (holding that
the proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of proving that the chal-
lenged search violated his or her Fourth Amendment rights); State v. Bertram, 591
A.2d 14, 18 (R.I. 1991) (holding that defendants have the burden of establishing
their standing to challenge the legality of the search and the admissibility of the
seized evidence); State v. Porter, 437 A.2d 1368, 1371 (R.I. 1981) (same); State v.
Cortellesso, 417 A.2d 299, 301 (R.I. 1980) (same)).
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 1266.
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proposition that one who drives an automobile with the owner's
permission has standing to challenge a search of that vehicle.
However, the court contradicted the federal case law, instead ad-
hering to the precedent in its own jurisdiction, by holding that the
state does not have the burden of disproving an automobile opera-
tor's standing. Rather, the court emphasized the defendant's bur-
den of proving his or her standing to challenge the legality of the
vehicle search and the admissibility of evidence seized therein.
Neal R. Pandozzi
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Criminal Law. State v. Peterson, 722 A.2d. 259 (R.I. 1998). When
a defendant attempts to cross-examination a witness, the defend-
ant is granted reasonable latitude to explore and establish any pos-
sible bias, prejudice, or ulterior motive that might affect the
witness' testimony. A criminal defendant must be given timely no-
tice of the states intent to adjudicate the defendant pursuant to the
habitual offender statute, Rhode Island General Laws section 12-
19-21.
In State v. Peterson,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court deter-
mined two important issues. First, the court decided that the trial
justice did not err in limiting defendant's cross-examination of a
crucial state witness regarding possible bias. Second, a majority of
the court determined that, pursuant to Rhode Island's habitual
criminal statute,2 the state did not have to notify the defendant
within forty-five days of the arraignment.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The defendant, Bradley Peterson (Peterson), was charged with
the crime of robbery in the second degree, in violation of Rhode
Island General Laws section 11-39-1, and was considered a habit-
ual offender pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws section 12-19-
21.4 At trial before the superior court, Joseph Kaiser, the com-
plaining witness, testified to the following narrative. On March
1. 722 A.2d 259 (R.I. 1998).
2. The habitual criminal statute, Rhode Island General Laws section 12-19-
21, provides in pertinent part:
(b)Whenever it appears a person shall be deemed an 'habitual criminal,'
the attorney general, within forty-five (45) days of the arraignment, but in
no case later than the date of the pretrial conference, may file with the
court, a notice specifying that the defendant, upon conviction, is subject to
the imposition of an additional sentence in accordance with this section;
provided, however, that in no case shall the fact that the defendant is
alleged to be a habitual offender be an issue upon the trial of the defend-
ant, nor shall it be disclosed to the jury.... If it appears by a preponder-
ance of the evidence presented that the defendant is a habitual criminal
under this section, he or she shall be sentenced by the court to an addi-
tional consecutive term of imprisonment of not exceeding twenty-five (25)
years; and provided further, that the court shall order the defendant to
serve a minimum number of years of the sentence before he or she be-
comes eligible for parole.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-21(b) (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
3. See Peterson, 722 A.2d at 265.
4. See id. at 260.
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18, 1993, as Joseph Kaiser (Kaiser) drove from work to his home in
Newport, Peterson suddenly entered the roadway directly in front
of his vehicle.5 Peterson acted as if he had been struck by the car,
and proceeded to lay face-down on the sidewalk about six to ten
feet away.6
Kaiser, doubting that he had struck and injured Peterson, nev-
ertheless stepped out of his truck, leaving the driver's door open,
and called for the pedestrian to get up, to which there was no re-
sponse.7 After Kaiser called out for the third time, the man got up,
brushed himself off, and ran straight towards Kaiser.8 The two ex-
changed words and a struggle ensued. Eventually, Kaiser was
pushed to the ground and lay there as he watched the defendant
steal his truck.9 Kaiser's vehicle was found the next day, aban-
doned in Providence, with some expensive items missing.10
Subsequently, on April 8, 1993, Peterson was arrested on an
outstanding domestic assault warrant, after Susan Rosa (Susan),
his live-in girlfriend, contacted the Middletown Police and in-
formed them of Peterson's carjacking. 11 The following day, Kaiser
identified Peterson from a photographic array presented to him by
the police. 12
At trial, Susan testified that Peterson told her about his
caijacking of Kaiser's vehicle.' 3 Furthermore, Susan testified that
she was pregnant, had a new boyfriend, and that she wanted Pe-
terson to stay in jail and out of her life. 14 The trial justice limited
Peterson's defense counsel from cross-examining Susan regarding
her relationship with her new boyfriend.' 5
In his appeal to the supreme court, Peterson argued that his
constitutional rights were violated because he was not permitted to
question Susan regarding her relationship with another man.16
Such examination, according to Peterson, may have revealed a mo-
5. See id. at 261.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 262.
16. See id.
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tivation for Susan to lie, and that she and her lover were conspir-
ing to frame Peterson.17
Peterson also argued that the state failed to notify him of its
intent to seek adjudication pursuant to the habitual offender stat-
ute.' He claimed that the trial justice's determination that the de-
fendant was well-informed of the state's intent to adjudicate him
pursuant to the habitual offender statute was clear error, and
therefore warranted a vacation of the enhanced sentence. 19
BACKGROUND
Recently, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
"[eiffective cross-examination is an essential element of the presen-
tation of a full and fair defense and is guaranteed by both the State
and the Federal Constitutions."20 The supreme court, in State v.
Veluzat,21 noted that "the cross-examiner must be given a reason-
able opportunity to explore and to establish any possible bias, prej-
udice, or ulterior motive that a witness may possess that might
affect the witness' testimony."22 However, in State v. Eckhart,
23
the court held that a defendant may not use cross-examination to
"harass, annoy, or humiliate the witness, or [ask] questions that
are irrelevant or contain no probative value."24
Rhode Island's habitual offender statute provides for enhanced
penalties for persons previously convicted of two or more felonies. 25
The state is required to notify the defendant, within forty-five days
of the arraignment date, that it intends to proceed under the
statute.2
6
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Peterson court first addressed the defendant's contention
that his constitutional rights were violated because he was not per-
mitted to question/probe into witness' bias or prejudice toward the
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 265.
20. Id. at 262 (quoting State v. Doctor, 690 A.2d 321, 327 (R.I. 1997)).
21. 578 A.2d 93 (R.I. 1990).
22. Peterson, 722 A.2d at 262 (quoting Veluzat, 578 A.2d at 94-95).
23. 367 A.2d 1073 (R.I. 1977).
24. Peterson, 722 A.2d at 262 (citing Eckhart, 367 A.2d at 1076).
25. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-21 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
26. See id. § 12-19-21(b).
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defendant on cross-examination. 27 The court agreed with the de-
fendant's contention that he should be allowed to demonstrate bias
in the witness. 28 However, the court was unwilling to allow the
defendant to "harass, annoy, or humiliate the witness, or [ask]
questions that are irrelevant or contain no probative value."29 The
court stated that "counsel for defendant was given reasonable lati-
tude to explore the elements of bias," and "even allowing counsel
... unlimited cross-examination ... would have no effect on the
outcome of the trial."30
The supreme court next addressed the defendant's contention
that the state failed to notify him of its intent to seek adjudication
pursuant to the habitual offender statute within the statutorily im-
posed forty-five day time limit.3 1 The court, confronted with an
ambiguous statute, had to examine the statute in order to "glean
the intent and purpose of the Legislature."32 The court determined
that the language in section 12-19-21 does not allow a defendant to
avoid the adjudication as a habitual offender solely because the
pretrial conference was continued.33
Dissenting from the majority on this issue, Justice Goldberg
did not agree that the Legislature intended the state to have "the
option of presenting notice either within forty-five days at the ar-
raignment or at some point before the pretrial conference is
held."34 Therefore, Justice Goldberg would vacate the habitual of-
fender sentence.35
CONCLUSION
In Peterson, the Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly follows
established state and federal law. A defendant, attempting cross-
examination, must be granted reasonable latitude "to explore and
establish any possible bias, prejudice, or ulterior motive that might
affect the witness' testimony."36 Also, timely notice of states intent
27. Peterson, 722 A.2d at 262.
28. See id. at 263.
29. Id. at 262 (citing Eckhart, 367 A.2d at 1076).
30. Id. at 263.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 264.
33. See id. at 265.
34. Id. at 267.
35. See id. at 268.
36. Id. at 262.
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to adjudicate the defendant pursuant to the habitual offender stat-
ute, Rhode Island General Laws section 12-19-21, must be given to
the criminal defendant.37 Under the facts of the case the defend-
ant clearly had ample opportunity to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses and was granted timely notice of the states intent to
adjudicate the defendant pursuant to the habitual offender statute.
B. Jason Erb
37. See id. at 265.
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Criminal Law. State v. Tevay, 707 A.2d 700 (R.I. 1998). An attor-
ney is precluded from arguing in a closing argument that a wit-
ness' testimony is inconsistent with a prior statement made to the
police unless evidence in the record establishes the inconsistency.
In order to evaluate whether a trial judge presented a jury with
proper legal principles in the judge's jury instructions, one must
look at the jury instructions in their entirety to determine if they
are appropriate for an ordinary jury.
In State v. Tevay,1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
a reference made in the opposing side's opening statement does
not constitute sufficient evidence to argue inconsistencies in a clos-
ing argument. 2 Therefore, an attorney must find evidence in the
record supporting the inconsistencies of a witness' statements in
order to argue the inconsistency in the attorney's closing
argument. 3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The defendant, Nolan R. Tevay (Tevay), was tried and con-
victed of one of two counts of second-degree sexual child molesta-
tion in violation of section 11-37-8.3 of the Rhode Island General
Laws.4 Tevay was charged with one count of touching a child's va-
gina with his hand (Count One) and one count of forcing a child to
touch his penis (Count Two).
According to the twelve year old female victim (Jody), one af-
ternoon in the summer of 1994, Jody entered her mother's bedroom
to wake Tevay at the request of her mother.6 Once Jody entered
the room she began to shake Tevay to wake him at which time the
defendant grabbed Jody and pulled her into his bed.6 Tevay alleg-
edly touched her buttock and forced the young girl to touch his pe-
nis.7 According to Jody, Tevay's eyes were partially open during
the incident and, when the incident was over, Tevay told Jody he
1. 707 A.2d 700 (R.I. 1998).
2. Id. at 702.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 701.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
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would beat her if she told anyone what happened.8 Soon after this
incident, Tevay moved out of the house for unrelated reasons.9
In February of 1995, after being informed that Tevay would be
moving back into their house, Jody told her mother about the inci-
dent with Tevay from the summer of 1994.10 Jody later gave a
statement to the police and told them that Tevay forced her to
touch his penis and he touched her vagina." However, when the
victim testified at trial she stated that Tevay never touched her
vagina. 12 She did, however, confirm that he forced her to touch his
penis.13
Tevay's attorney succeeded in having Count One dismissed in
superior court, however Tevay was convicted of Count Two. 14 De-
fendant's attorney was successful in keeping out the police report
which alleged the touching of the victim's vagina.15 Since the vic-
tim failed to provide any evidence of the touching of her vagina,
Count One was dismissed.' 6 During the trial, Tevay testified that
he was a "heavy sleeper" and that there was a "ten percent chance"
that the incident occurred without his knowledge.' 7 The trial
judge prohibited defense counsel from mentioning in his closing ar-
gument that Jody's trial testimony, regarding the touching of her
vagina by the defendant, was wholly inconsistent with her police
statement that the defendant had touched her vagina.',
The trial judge submitted Count Two to the jury and in-
structed the jury that "they must find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Tevay's conduct was intentional and had as its purpose sexual
arousal or gratification."19 Defense counsel objected to this in-
struction and the failure of the judge to instruct on the defense of
accident or mistake-of-fact. 20 After this objection, the trial judge
amended his instruction to state that the prosecution must prove
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 701-02.
15. See id. at 702.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 701.
18. See id. at 702.
19. Id.
20. See id.
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the defendant's conduct was intentional "beyond a reasonable
doubt and 'that [Tevay] may not be found guilty of conduct which
you feel from the evidence, causes you to conclude that the conduct
was accidental.' 2 1 Defense counsel again objected and repeated
the request for a mistake-of-fact instruction which was denied. 22
The jury deliberated and convicted the defendant of Count two.23
The defendant appealed his conviction to the supreme court.24
BACKGROUND
In Avarista v. Aloisio,25 Rhode Island's Supreme Court consid-
ered the issue of the evidentiary nature of references made in an
attorney's opening statement. The court held in Avarista that ref-
erences made in an opening statement do not constitute
evidence. 26
The court addressed the issue of the sufficiency of jury instruc-
tions in State v. Grabowski.27 The Grabowski court stated that a
"jury charge must cover the law adequately" in order to withstand
an appeal. 28 Jury instructions should be examined "in their en-
tirety to determine the manner in which a jury of ordinary, intelli-
gent lay persons would have comprehended them."29  In
Grabowski, the court held that one must read all of the "allegedly
inadequate instructions in the context as a whole" to determine if a
judge's jury instructions were adequate.30
ANALYsis AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held a defense attorney is
not entitled to argue in his closing argument that the victim's in-
court testimony was inconsistent with a prior police statement.31
Furthermore, the court stated that a jury instruction by a trial
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. 672 A.2d 887, 892 (R.I. 1996).
26. Tevay, 707 A.2d at 702 (citing Avarista, 672 A.2d at 892).
27. 672 A.2d 879, 882 (R.I. 1996).
28. Tevay, 707 A.2d at 702 (quoting Grabowski, 672 A.2d at 882).
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
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court judge must cover the law adequately.3 2 Since the judge cov-
ered the law adequately the instruction was acceptable. 33
The defendant's presented two issues for appeal: first, whether
the trial judge's prohibition of the topic of the victim's inconsistent
statements was appropriate, and second, if the trial court judge's
jury instructions were sufficient.34
Rhode Island's highest court held that the trial court's prohibi-
tion of the discussion of the victim's inconsistent statement was
appropriate. 35 Defense council suggested they were entitled to ar-
gue on this topic since the victim had contradicted herself on the
stand.36 Defense council hoped to "draw a negative inference re-
garding whether Jody testified truthfully to having been force to
touch Tevay's penis" since she contradicted herself on the other
count.37 The court held that unless "evidence was presented con-
cerning vaginal touching, the trial justice properly prohibited de-
fense counsel's closing argument that Jody's trial testimony was
inconsistent."38 The court further stated that although the prose-
cutor referred to the alleged vaginal touching in the opening state-
ment, an "opening statement does not constitute evidence."39
Therefore, due to this lack of evidence, defendant was not allowed
to argue regarding the inconsistencies in the closing argument
and, thus, the court denied this portion of the defendant's appeal.40
The supreme court also addressed the issue of the sufficiency
of the trial judge's jury instruction.4 1 Defense counsel suggested
that the trial judge's instructions failed to inform the jury regard-
ing the mens rea requirement and the accident and mistake-of-fact
defenses. 42
The court disagreed with defense counsel and found that the
trial judge's instructions were sufficient. 43 The court stated that
jury instructions must be viewed "'in the context as a whole'" to
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. (citing Avarista v. Aloisio, 672 A.2d 887, 892 (R.I. 1996)).
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
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determine if the instruction has "'fairly set forth for the jury the
legal principles controlling a crucial factual issue.'"" The court
noted that although the trial judge denied the defendant's request
to specifically instruct on mistake-of-fact, the court was "of the
opinion that both accident and mistake-of-fact in the context for
this case relate to the same defense theory."45 Specifically, the
court saw the defense to be that the "accident was the mistaken
belief that Jody was Tevay's wife."46 The court reasoned that the
jury had been informed as to this defense by the trial judge's in-
structions adequately and, thus, the instructions were sufficient.47
Therefore, since the court felt that the trial judge's instruction to
the jury and the prohibition on the defense counsel's argument
were appropriate, the court denied the defendant's appeal.48
CONCLUSION
Ordinarily, if an attorney wishes to discuss the inconsistencies
of a witness' testimony in closing argument, the attorney must be
able to point to evidence in the record displaying this inconsis-
tency. The result of this ruling is that a defendant may be unable
to discuss the falsity of an alleged victim's statement unless the
defendant allows the prosecution to bring in otherwise potentially
damaging evidence. The court in Tevay also decided that one must
look at a judge's allegedly insufficient jury instructions as a whole
in order to properly determine if the instructions are sufficient for
an ordinary jury to use in its mission as finders of fact.
Kevin B. Hylton
44. Id. (quoting State v. Grabowski, 672 A.2d 879, 882 (R.I. 1996)).
45. Id. at 702.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
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Criminal Law. State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759 (R.I. 1998). In a
prosecution for child-molestation sexual assault, the defendant's
mistaken belief of the victim's age is not a defense. As this is a
strict liability offense, a defendant's due process rights are not vio-
lated if the prosecution does not prove the defendant knew the vic-
tim's age.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In State v. Yanez, 1 a jury convicted the defendant, Alejandro
Yanez (Yanez), of first-degree child-molestation sexual assault.2
Yanez was eighteen at the time and the victim, Allison, was thir-
teen-years old.3 The two met briefly in August 1992.4 There was
almost no further contact between them until July 1993, when
Yanez gave Allison a ride to a park in his automobile where she
was meeting some friends.5 Yanez gave Allison his telephone
number then talked to her on the telephone later that night.6
The next day Allison again spoke to Yanez on the phone and
they agreed to meet in a parking lot behind St. Joseph's Church in
West Warwick. 7 After meeting there, they went to a house owned
by one of Yanez's friends where they engaged in consensual sexual
intercourse.8 Allison then returned home and was confronted by
her mother.9 Her mother asked if she had engaged in sexual inter-
course. 10 Allison denied it at first but later admitted she had sex-
ual intercourse with a partner named Derek." Allison explained
she did not want her mother to know she had sex with Yanez.12
Yanez admitted having sex with Allison but claimed she told him
1. 716 A.2d 759 (R.I. 1998).
2. Id. at 762.
3. See id. at 760 (stating that Allison is a fictitious name).
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 760-61.
8. See id. at 761.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
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that she was sixteen.' 3 Allison denied this and claimed she told
Yanez two or three times that she was only thirteen.14
Yanez was indicted under Rhode Island General Laws sections
11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.2., first-degree child-molestation sexual as-
sault.'5 At trial, the judge refused to admit evidence demonstrat-
ing Yanez's mistaken belief of Allison's age and evidence
concerning Allison's apparent maturity based on her appearance
and demeanor. 16 The trial judge denied Yanez's request that the
jury be instructed on the mistake-of-fact defense and instead in-
structed the jury that it did not matter that Yanez wrongly be-
lieved Allison was over the age of consent. 17 The jury found Yanez
guilty of first-degree child molestation sexual assault.' 8 Yanez ap-
pealed claiming the judge erred in refusing to allow him the oppor-
tunity to present a mistake-of-age defense. 19
BACKGROUND
The origins of the crime of statutory rape date back to thir-
teenth-century England.20 The offense was meant to protect those
in society that were too young to understand the consequences of
engaging in sexual intercourse. 2 1 The mistake-of-fact defense in
regard to the victim's age in a statutory rape prosecution was origi-
nally rejected in England and the United States.22 Statutory rape
was regarded as a strict liability offense until California became
the first state to recognize the mistake-of-fact defense in 1964.23
Most courts, however, have continued to reject the reasonable mis-
take of a victim's age as a defense to statutory rape.24
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 762.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 766.
20. See id. at 763.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. (referring to People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964)).
24. See id.
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ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
Yanez argued that the Rhode Island Supreme Court must im-
ply a mens rea requirement with respect to the age of the victim
based on its previous interpretation of the terms "sexual penetra-
tion" and "sexual contact."25 The court rejected this argument by
interpreting the first-degree child-molestation sexual-assault stat-
ute according to its plain words and meaning. 26 The court recited
section 11-37-8.1, which provides "[a] person is guilty of first de-
gree child molestation sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual
penetration with a person fourteen (14) years of age or under."27
The court then noted the definition of "sexual penetration" in sec-
tion 11-37-1(8) as "sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, and
anal intercourse or any other intrusion, however slight, by any
part of a person's body ....
The court held that section 11-37-8.1, according to its plain
words, prohibits sexual penetration of any underaged person while
making no reference to a defendant's state of mind, knowledge or
belief as to the victim's age. 29 The court felt the legislature had
intentionally deleted any reference to mens rea so that a person
charged with sexual penetration of a child fourteen years or
younger would not escape the consequences of his actions by using
consent or mistake-of-age as a defense. 30 The court refused to in-
clude a mens rea requirement in the statute when one was not in-
tended by the legislature. 31
Yanez argued he was deprived of his due process rights be-
cause he was convicted under a criminal statute which did not in-
clude a mens rea element.32 In order for Yanez to prevail on this
argument the court noted, he would have to demonstrate this stat-
ute "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 33 The
25. See id. at 764 (referring to State v. Griffith, 660 A.2d 704 (R.I. 1995); State
v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528 (R.I. 1992)).
26. See id.
27. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.1 (1956) (1994 Reenactment)).
28. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(8) (1956) (1994 Reenactment)).
29. See id.
30. See id. at 765.
31. See id. at 766.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 767 (quoting United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir.
1991)).
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court felt Yanez could not prevail because although a mens rea re-
quirement exists for every crime, the United States Supreme Court
has recognized several exceptions to this rule.34 Included as an
exception were "sex offenses, such as rape, in which the victim's
actual age was determinative despite defendant's reasonable belief
that the girl had reached age of consent."36 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court rejected Yanez's due process challenge and noted
the state must only prove beyond a reasonable doubt the act oc-
curred; meaning that Yanez engaged in sexual intercourse with a
person fourteen years old or younger. 36
Dissenting Opinion
Justice Flanders expressed his disagreement with the major-
ity's conclusion in a lengthy dissent.37 He stated that section 11-
37-8.1, which carries a mandatory minimum jail sentence of
twenty years, does not bar a defendant from presenting a reason-
able mistake-of-age defense. 38 He referred to the majority's hold-
ing as "a draconian interpretation of this law" which imposed an
"undeserved punishment that is so out of whack with reality that it
is virtually without parallel in any jurisdiction of the United
States."39
Justice Flanders stated that the intent of the General Assem-
bly, in enacting section 11-37-8.1, was to severely punish adults
who molest children.40 He did not feel this severe punishment
should be directed to situations where "two teenage lovers engage
in a fully consensual act (or acts) of sexual intercourse in the mis-
taken belief on the part of one of them that they are both of a legal
age to do so."4 1 Justice Flanders called for a rational interpreta-
tion of the statute which would distinguish between these two sce-
34. See id. (referring to Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)).
35. Id. (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251 n.8).
36. See id.
37. See id. at 771-87.
38. See id. at 771. Yanez was sentenced to twenty years in prison with eight-
een years suspended. See id. at 772 n.10.
39. Id. at 771-72.
40. See id. at 772.
41. Id. Justice Flanders interpreted the facts differently from the majority's
belief that this case arose from a single encounter between Allison and Yanez. He
reasoned that, based on Allison's testimony at trial, she and Yanez had been dat-
ing. See id. at 772 n.12.
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narios.42 He stated he would hold that the General Assembly had
intended for a jury to sort out cases of actual child molestation
from situations where two teenagers engage in consensual sexual
intercourse.4 In order for a jury to do this the defendant must be
allowed to present evidence showing he had a reasonable and good-
faith mistake concerning his partner's age.44
CONCLUSION
In State v. Yanez, the Rhode Island Supreme Court deter-
mined that statutory rape is a strict liability crime; that is, the
state need not prove mens rea on the part of the defendant. All
that is required to be found guilty of statutory rape in Rhode Is-
land is for the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the act, sexual intercourse with a person fourteen years old or
under, had occurred. The defendant's knowledge, belief and state
of mind are all inadmissible to prove he reasonably believed the
victim had reached the age of consent.
Thomas M. Robinson
42. See id. at 772.
43. See id. at 773.
44. See id.
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